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Abstract
Overthe lastfewdecades, theco-operativebanking sector in Germany hassteadily increased
its market share attheexpense ofothertypes ofbanks. This outcome is surprising fromthe
standpoint oftraditional economic thinking about co-operatives, which suggests that they are
most appropriate for“backward” economies. We develop a model ofco-operative banksthat
highlights the dual role ofmembers as borrowers and lenders. We show that a shift in the
median (hence pivotal) member of the co-operative from predominantly a borrower
orientation toward a lenderorientationcauses the co-operative bank to shift its policy from
underpricing credit toward theprovision ofcompetitively priced credit and deposit services.
Together with a nationwide supporting infrastructureto capture scale and scope economies
(the Verbund), themarket-oriented policy ofGermanco-operative banks today allows them
to compete successfully with other banking groups.
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It is widely recognizedthat co-operative financial institutions can play a key role in
developing countries and in economically disadvantagedregions of advanced countries today
(Srinivasan, 1994). Co-operative financialinstitutions are typically seen as filling a market niche
consisting oflow-income entrepreneurs, small businesspeople,or farmerswho needcredit but
who have essentiallyno collateral with which to secure a loan. Inother words, co-operative
financial institutions maybe particularly well-suited to bringing bankingservices to the
otherwise “unbankable.” Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) describe credit co-operatives as
“rotating savings and credit associations” and show howthey rely on mutual screening and
monitoring oftheirmembers to enforcecontracts. Co-operative financial institutions effectively
substitute “reputationalcapital” fortraditional physical orfinancial capital.
Implicit orexplicit in much ofthe literature on financial co-operatives is the notion that
they are “appropriate technology” forrelatively backward economies, but should fade away or
disappearaltogetheras economic developmentproceeds.’ Co-operative financialinstitutions did,
in fact, play an important historical role in Germanybeginning in 1778; they had appeared by
1831 in the United States and in many otherindustrializing countries at about the same time
(Shay, 1992, p. 833). However, co-operative financial institutions did not disappearwith
economic development in industrialized countries. In fact, they are among the fastestgrowing
groups offinancialinstitutions in some advanced nations today.2
‘For example, Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993, p. 805) state unequivocally that “Roscas [rotating savings and credit
associationsi become less important in the process of economic development, however, since as individuals’ market
opportunities expand, the value of social sanctions declines, andthe sustainability ofRoscas becomes more
problematic.”
In several countries, such as the U.S., co~operative banks may enjoy tax advantages (credit unions). In other
countries, such as Germany, there are no differences in tax treatment among differenttypes of banks.
1We argue in this paperthat the conventionalview ofco-operative financial institutions is
incomplete because they are, in fact, adaptableto various sorts ofeconomic environments. We
illustrate this point by examining Germany’s co-operativebanking sector, the continued viability
ofwhich appears anomalous from the conventionalpoint ofview. InGermany, where all types
ofbanks engage in Allfinanz (including universal (i.e., commercial and investment) banking,
insurance, and relatedfinancial activities), the co-operativebanking sector competes directly
with all othertypes ofbanks. The range offinancial services provided and the terms offered are
virtually indistinguishable among the various types ofbanks (Ringle, 1989, p. 134). In addition,
there are very few clear demographic characteristics unique to the customers ofco-operatives or
any othertype ofbank in Germany today (Selbach, 1991, p. 106).
In fact,co-operative banks have done muchmore than merely survive the economic
maturationofpost-warGermany. Starting with about nine percent ofthe West German banking
market in the 1950s (measuredby total “volume ofbusiness,” which is total assets plus certain
off-balancesheet items), the co-operativebanking sector has steadily increased its market share
to almost 15% today (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1961, 1971, 1974, 1978, 1989, 1996). During the
sameperiod, the prototypicaluniversalbanks-- theprivately owned “BigThree”-- have seen their
domestic market share fall from 12-14% during the 1950s to only nine percent by 1996.~Despite
theirnot-for-profitnature, co-operative banks have earned returns on assets comparableto those
ofthe big private banks, as Figure 1 indicates.
~The remainder ofthe German banking market is accounted for by other privately owned commercial banks (15% of
the market as ofOctober 1996), the state-owned savings-bank sector (38%), public and private mortgage banks
(14%), and public banks with special functions (10%) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996, p. A20). Some of the private
mortgage banks are owned by members of other banking groups, a factnot reflectedin this unconsolidated sectoral
breakdown. The mortgagebanks owned by theco-operative-bank and savings-bank sectors dominate the market,
however, so afully consolidated sectoral breakdown would increase the apparent prominence of the co-operative
banks in Germany.
2This clear shift ofmarket share away from shareholder-owneduniversal banks and
toward co-operative institutions is remarkable forat leasttwo reasons. First, Germanco-
operativebanks expanded theirbalancesheets fasterthan thebanking sector asa whole even
though the market niche they were founded to serve-- small businesspeople and farmers-- has
shrunkcontinually as a proportion ofthe population. Not surprisingly, the growth ofco-
operative banks in Germany has come from non-traditional customers, namely creditworthy
businesses as borrowers and salary and wage earners as depositors and share owners (Klein-
Hessling, 1992). A growing proportion ofthese newer customers are not evenmembers ofthe
co-operativebanks from which they obtain financial services.
Theirpost-warmovement into the mainstreamofGermaneconomic life points out the
second remarkable feature ofGerman co-operative banks that would not be predicted on the
basis of standardanalyses ofco-operative financialinstitutions. Despite theirseemingly
inflexible and potentially inefficient ownership structure characterizedby “oneperson, one vote”
(Schmid, 1996, p. 28), German co-operativebanks successfully undertook major structural
reforms in the 1960s and 1970s in order to compete with otherbanking groups in the fieldof
Al~finanz.In addition to consolidating many small co-operative banks into larger, more efficient
units, competitiveness was enhanced by creating and formalizing(in 1972) a defacto financial
conglomerate in the form ofa sectoral Verbund, or mutual association, that provides central
clearing and refinancing facilities, aswell as real estate, insurance, securities, and other financial
services. Organizationally, some services areprovided to the manyremaining small primary co-
operativebanks by one or more ofthejointly owned “central banks” (ofwhich threeare regional
and one is national) orby specialized financial subsidiariesowned by the sector as a whole.
3Other financial services areprovided by independent firms that haveagreed to co-operate
exclusively with the primary banks in marketing and product delivery.
In order to provide an explanation forthe adaptability ofGerman co-operativebanks to
changingeconomic circumstances, we adapt the simple model ofa financial co-operative
contained in Hart and Moore(1996). Their model stresses diversity ofinterests among the
owners ofmutual institutions as the key to understanding theinstitutions’ behavior. As in Hart
and Moore, we abstract from agency problems between theowners and the managers. To be
sure, there are agency problems in co-operativebanks but this is also true ofshareholder-owned
banks. Instead, we focus on the diversity ofinterestsbetween membersofco-operative banks.
There are members whose primary interest in the association is to obtain credit; this corresponds
to the “unbankable” small businesspeople and farmersdescribed in most accounts ofcredit co-
operatives. Our model highlights the effect ofthe steadily increasing number ofmembers who
aremost interested in receiving a high rateofreturn on theirfinancial investment(deposits and
shares). This pits them against other members, who prefer low borrowing rates (hence low
returns on deposits and shares). Sinceco-operative financial institutions are democratic
organizations,the median owner’s preferences are pivotal.
Weprovide evidence that the pivotal ownerin the German co-operativebanking sector
probably shifted from the“borrower” type to the “investor” type sometime during thefirst few
postwar decades. Our conclusion is that, in contrast to the predictions ofthe previous literature
that co-operative financial institutions are inherently inflexible and hence arebound to die out as
theoriginal membership group wanes in importance, thedemocratic nature oftheseinstitutions’
ownershipin factcreates the possibility for adaptation and survival. Co-operative financial
4institutions constitute a dense network offinancial institutions that is convenient and familiar to a
large numberofpeople. Their recent evolution intomainstream financial-services providers was
certainly built on this foundationbut it also required major internal changes. The success of
thesechanges demonstrates that the co-operative form oforganizationis, in fact, quite flexible.
This, atleast, appears to be the lesson ofthe Germanco-operativebanking sector.
The paperbegins with background information on the German co-operative banking
sector (Section I). Section II adapts the stock-exchange model ofHart and Moore (1996) to a
banking context to illustrate how the governance structureofco-operativebanks is driven by the
preferences ofthe median member. We document changes in the membership ofco-operative
banks in Section III. We also discuss how the threat ofmember withdrawal is reflected in the
strategy of a co-operative bank. Section IVdescribes themulti-tiered co-operative banking
system in German-speaking countries, known asthe Verbund. We apply ourmodel to illustrate
how diversity ofinterests among co-operative banks may affect the governance ofthe Verbund
itself. Section V concludes.
5I. The Co-operativeBanking Sector in Germany: Klein aberFein (“small but mighty”)
The 2,520 “primary” co-operativebanks and the four“central institutions” ownedjointly
by theprimary banks together constitute thecore ofthe co-operativebanking sector in Germany
today (DeutscheBundesbank, 1996, p. A20). Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1803-1883) formed a
credit co-operative in 1850 forthe purpose ofprovidinglow-cost loans from and to other
craftsmen (Klein-Hessling, 1992, p. 27). The first agricultural credit co-operative wasfounded in
1864 by FriedrichWilhelm Raiffeisen (1818-1888). Wilhelm Haas(1839-1913) was important
in developing the supporting institutions that would later form the modern Verbund (Bonus and
Schmidt, 1990, p. 193; see Section IV below formore discussion ofthe Verbund). The legal
basis formodern German credit co-operatives waslaid downin a Prussian law of 1867; this
statute was incorporated into German law atthe time ofGerman political unification in 1870.
The Genossenschaftsgesetz of 1889 (“Law ofCo-operatives”) forms the basis oflaw that still
governs the legal status ofco-operatives in Germany today.4
Savings banks were also founded by local communities and governments in this period to
provide universal access to rudimentary financial services. By way ofcontrast, the membership
ofcredit co-operatives wasstrictly limited to those with a strong and demonstrablecommon
bond, either vocational orgeographic (often both). The reason why credit co-operatives and
savings banksemerged at this time in Germany is most likely the increase in credit demand and
the lackofcredit supply by existing banks. Small businesspeople faced competitive pressures to
“Other importantdates in the evolution of the German co-operativebanking sector include the following (for more
discussion, see Bonus and Schmidt, 1990, pp. 186-197). In 1871, deposits from non-members were first accepted.
In 1889, limited liability ofmembers became possible; by 1933, all German credit co-operatives had completed the
transition to limited liability. The Genossenschaftsgesetz (Law ofCo-operatives) was altered in 1922 to require all
credit co-operatives with atleast 10,000 members to adopt arepresentative assembly (Vertreterversammlung);
subsequently, this requirement was extended in 1926 to co-operatives with atleast 3,000 members. Loans tonon-
members werefirst allowed in 1973.
6invest in capital equipmentbut typically had no other collateral thanthe proposed purchase to
offer as security. The only source ofcredit formany was the local moneylender, who, through a
market-sharingcartel among moneylenders in the region,held an exclusive market position in a
given local area (Bonus and Schmidt, 1990, p. 187). Clearly, therewere strong economic
incentives to form mutual credit associationsif they could overcome organizational and
operational hurdles.
The structure and functioning ofcredit co-operativeswere based on the principles of“one
man, one vote” and mutual unlimited liability assumed by all members forthe debts ofthe co-
operative. In addition, the share ofthe ownership that any personcould obtain was strictly
limited and the shares themselves were non-tradable (except that ownerscould sellshares back to
the co-operative at a predetermined price). The co-operative movement had strong ideological
underpinnings. The leaders ofthe co-operative movement in Germany were either themselves
Liberal members ofParliament, as in thecases ofSchulze-Delitzsch and Haas, orwere, in the
case ofRaiffeisen, a religious Catholic, following deeply heldbeliefs (Born, 1976, p. 227).
Joint and unlimited liability made co-operative financial institutions “bankable”even if
the individual members were not. Given theirrole as financial guarantorsfor all other members,
each person had a strong incentive to choose recipients ofcredit with care and to monitor their
use and repaymentofthe credit vigilantly. The factthat each member ofthe co-operativeknew
much about all the other members and could observe newdevelopments relatively easily meant
that these arrangements were often feasible and incentive-compatible (Bonus and Schmidt, 1990,
p. 188; Schmid, 1996, pp. 7-9).
7IL The model
A. Overview ofthe model. Our model combines elements ofthe analyses ofco-operative
financial institutions contained in Besley, Coate, and Louiy (1993), Schmid(1996), and Hart and
Moore (1996). We consider amultiperiod co-operative association in which the members pool
theirendowmentsin order to make acquisition ofa capital good possible forat least some
members soonerthan would be the caseunder autarky, as in Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993).
Unlikethe latter authors but like Schmid (1996), weassume that memberswould like to borrow
fromthe co-operative as often aspossible (Besley, Coate, and Loury assume that each member
only wants to borrow once). Also following Schmid (1996), we focus on the design ofincentives
that make a credit co-operativesustainable over time in the face ofpotentially strong incentives
for some members (those served early) to withdraw before all members have been served.
In contrastto Schmid (1996), however, we analyze a model in which themulti-period
contracting problemcollapses to a single-period pricing decisionthat is repeated over and over.
This is because,unlike Schmid (1996), weassume that (1) both exit from and entry into a co-
operative are possible at any time, and (2)property rights to accumulated surplusin aco-
operative are not well-defined. The key implication ofthese two assumptions is that aco-
operative rationally chooses not to accumulate any retainedearnings (above theminimum level
that is required to operate).5 In general, this may result from inefficient use ofresources
(expense-preference behaviororother agency costs) orthrough “overproduction,”that is,
operating beyond efficient scale. We consider the latter case in which theco-operative uses
resources in the right proportions but uses too many ofthem. By pricingat average cost, no
~Co-operative banks are subjectto minimumcapital requirements as are all other types ofbanks inGermany. The
not-for-profit orientation of co-operative banks was institutionalized in the Genossenschaftsgesetz (“Law ofCo-
operatives”)of 1889 (Bonus and Schmidt, 1990, p. 190),
8profits are earned. Sincethere are no retainedearnings, the co-operative begins eachperiod from
an identical starting point.
There is an important intertemporal link in ourmodel, however. This is because a
borrower-dominated co-operative always chooses to set theprice ofcredit at abelow-market
level.6 This provides an incentive formembers to remain in the co-operative, since it is only
through borrowing that they receive any benefits from membership. Conversely, weshow in
Section III that, in an investor-dominated co-operative, the nature ofthe intertemporal link
changes because thebenefit ofsubsidized credit is less attractive. Profits areearned and paid out
eachperiod as a dividend in this case. As before, however, the co-operativebegins eachperiod
in the identical situation ofzero (excess) retainedearnings.
The fact that we are able to analyze a recurring single-period model to describe the
dynamic decision problem ofthe co-operative means that we can apply the single-period model
ofa co-operative institution with diverse member preferences contained in Hart and Moore
(1996). The analysis in Hart and Moore (1996) shows how members’ preferences influence the
co-operative’s actions through the democratic voting structure.
B. The model. We follow Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) by considering a group of
individuals eachofwhom wishes to purchase an expensiveindivisible good. A co-operative
savings and credit association canimprove the exante welfare ofthis group by poolingtheir
individual resources and allocating funds to selected individuals. This allows these individuals
to purchase and obtain thebenefits ofthe indivisible good earlier thanwould be possible under
6In adapting Hart and Moore (1996) to our context, we assume that members of a co-operative have differing
demands for credit. We referto members who have a high willingness topay for credit as “borrowers” and
members who have a relatively low willingness to pay for credit as “investors” (because their primary source of
benefit fromjoining the co-operative is thereturn they receive on their financial investmentin it).
9autarky. However, the individuals we consider would like to borrow as often as possible.
Therefore, a co-operative member still might want to remain in the association afterhaving
received credit once. This assumption differs from that ofBesley, Coate, and Loury (1993) and
gives rise to different types ofdynamic incentive schemes to maintain the membership, as
discussedin Schmid (1996, pp. 7-9). We discuss these further below.
Adaptingthe model ofa stock exchange in Hart and Moore (1996),we assume that 2N-l
people form a co-operativebank atdatezero in a market currently served by a monopolistic
lender. The co-operative association may last indefinitely, as existing members may withdraw
but new members mayjoin. The benefit ofcredit derived by member i at date zero, where
i=1,2,...,2N-1, is describedby the demand curve D1(P) on the priceinterval [v,V], where the
members are ranked from the lowest to the highest demand forcredit at a given minimumprice
equal to v (see Figure 2). Nomember demands any credit at a pricehigher than V and all are
satiatedby the time the pricefalls to v. The aggregatedemand curve is obtained by summing all
2N—1
the individual demandcurves horizontally, giving D(P) = Q~(V-P)/(V-v) where Q~ = q~.
The marginal cost ofsupplying a unit ofcredit is rising in the amount lent.7 The ideahere
is that the fundsbeing lent by the co-operativeare subject to increasing returns to scale, sothere
is an increasing opportunity cost associated with the loanable funds. This might be due to
minimumfeasible sizes formembers’ investments orscale barriers to entering capital markets;
largerpools ofcapital earn higher returns. The total cost oflending is C(Q) = F + cQ2/2; this
cost function is common to all types oflenders. Thus, the marginal cost oflending is cQ, where
Q is thequantity ofcredit extended by a single lender. The fixed cost includes all items suchas
‘ This differs from Hart andMoore’s assumption of constant marginal costs and is importantfor our results.
10the minimumphysical capital that is necessary to operate. The average cost oflending, Q, is
C(Q)/Q = F/Q + cQ/2 = AC(Q). We assume that v AC(Q) V; that is, for any feasible level
ofoutput Q, there exists a price in the range (v,V) that allows the lender to breakeven.
The one-period profit earned by any lenderat priceP is
(1) H(P)=[Q~~](P_cQ)_F for vPV.
A monopolist would maximize profit by setting priceequal to Pm=(1/2)(cQ+V), which is clearly
abovemarginal cost (see the Appendix).
Wenow adapt the multi-period analysis in Schmid (1996, pp. 7-9) by assuming that (1)
both exit and entry into a co-operative arepossible at any time, and (2) property rights in aco-
operative arenot well-defined enough to allow accumulatedearnings to be appropriatedby
individual members. In particular, neither a withdrawing nor aremaining member has any legal
claim to any ofthe co-operative’s assets in excess ofthe nominal face value ofthe member’s
share(s), which he canreclaim at any time.
Schmid suggests that aprofit-maximizing co-operative is sustainable regardlessofits
dividend policy. This is because, in his model, it canretain earnings to deterexit by members
who havealready been allowed to borrow. He argues that, since co-operative membership shares
areredeemable only by theco-operative itself at theiroriginal face value, withdrawalmeans
relinquishing any control over thebank’s retainedearnings which could be used to favor the
remaining members. This creates an incentive to remain a member even afterhavingborrowed
and repaid theloan. Note that theincentive mechanism he describesrequires well-defined
property rights ofthe remaining members to the accumulated surplus ofthe co-operative.
11Schmid’s analysis oftheincentive-compatibility oftheco-operative bank retaining
earnings in order to keep the membership intact does not go through oncewe assume that new
members may enter at any time and that they receive identical shares in theownership ofthe co-
operative’s accumulated earnings. This obviously creates a free-rider problemin the sense that
someone previously outside the co-operativecanjoin at any time to claim part ofthe earnings in
the accumulation ofwhich they played no part. But this negates the abilityofpotentially
forfeited profit shares to deterwithdrawal, since remainingmembers have no control over this
surplus. Consequently, they have no incentive to earnprofits that willbe usurpedby new
members. Why give up currentbenefits (dividends or low-pricedcredit) to accumulate profits if
they can’t be protectedfrom encroachers?
Ofcourse, the lackofwell-definedproperty rights to accumulated surplus doesn’t explain
why a co-operative wouldn’t lendto its members at a profit-maximizing priceand then pay out
the earnings immediately as dividends to all currentmembers. Our assertion that this will not
happen in the initial circumstances we consider derives from the basic insight ofthe Hart and
Moore model ofa co-operative. Ifthe median member ofthe co-operativeplaces a higher value
on the chance to borrow than to receive a dividend-- due to increasing returns to scale in this
member’s business enterprise-- then this member’s preference willbe to maximize the volume of
lending that the co-operative does, ratherthan theprofit it earns. This increases the chance that
any given borrowerwill be allocated credit in a given period.
Thus, the co-operative atdate zero sets the price atsuch a low level that therewill be no
profit. The greatest feasible amount ofcredit is the amount defined by the intersection ofthe
demand curve and theaverage-cost curve. Given increasing marginal costs, this implies a price
12below marginal cost. This is an inefficient use ofresources, but it is incentive-compatible forthe
current members, who cannot appropriate the profitthat an efficientuse ofresources would
generate (since dividends are not highly valued).
C. The dual roles ofborrower and lenderin a co-operative bank. Now we examine the
incentivesand behavior ofa credit co-operative in more detail. Eachmember receives two types
ofreward, namely, some consumer surplus in the form ofbenefits from borrowing and some
producer surplusin the formofareturn on investment in theco-operative itself.8 In contrast, a
profit-maximizingownerwould only takeproducer surplus intoaccount, while ignoring the
implications any decision might have on consumer surplus.
The consumer surplusenjoyedby a co-operative member is depicted in the left-hand
panel ofFigure 3, where member i’s demandcurve for credit is shown. The right-hand panel of
Figure 3, which shows themember’s supply curve ofinvestment, depicts the member’sproducer
surplus. Fortractability, we take the member’s investment in the co-operative as fixed at his
entire endowment,j~~9 This endowmentneed not be liquid oreven curently available. In fact, the
assumption ofjoint and unlimited liability by all the members ofthe credit co-operative allows
the co-operative to obtain liquid funds from a bank on the basis ofthe membership’stotal assets
and earnings prospects. It is in this sense that the liability structure ofthe co-operative allows the
membersto liquify their“reputational capital.”
Ifcredit is made available by the co-operative at price Pm in Figure 3, the member’s
consumer surplus is equal to thearea A. Suppose that themember’s return on alternative
~We term the benefits of borrowing “consumer surplus” because it will be measured as the area under the members’
demand curvefor credit. Similarly, returns on investment are termed “producer surplus” because this quantity will
be measured as the area above the opportunity cost of funds.
~ considerthe incentives of a member to reduce his investment in the co-operative-- i.e., exit-- in Section III
below.
13investment is as shown in the supply curve ofthe right-handpanel, S,(P). The amount of
producer surplus a co-operative member receives is givenby the areaC+D at this price. Forease
ofillustration in the figures, we assume that the lending rateand the return on deposits
(investmentin the co-operative) areequal; in other words, there are no fixed oradministrative
costs and no retention ofsurplus. We take all costs into account in the formalmodel below.
Ifthe co-operative offers credit at a priceP~, then consumer surplus risesto A+B while
producer surplus becomesD-E. Note that the co-operative member’sproducer surplus is reduced
by any investmentbeyondl~.Clearly, a profit-maximizing lenderwould prefer the higherprice,
since he faces no trade-offbetween consumer and producer surplus.
Formally, member i’s payoff from his membership in the co-operativeis
(2) u.(P) = q1(V — P)2 + ~ 1 ~ff QV(V — P) (P — cQ)l — Fl for vPV
2(V—v) [(2N—1)JL[ V—v J J
where the first term ofthe sum represents consumer (borrower) surplus and the second term
represents producer (investor) surplus.1°In contrastto the simplified illustration in Figure 3, all
costs in addition to the cost offundsare taken into account in (2).
Since the only decision the co-operative must make in oursimple model is what price for
credit to charge in thecurrent period, and sincethe median voter is crucial in every democratic
institution, there is a single member whose preferences are pivotal. In terms ofourmodel, this
member is the one whose demand forcredit falls at themedian ofthe distributionofall
members; call this person member N. That is, N -1 members have demandcurves lower and
steeper than member N whilethe other N-1 members havedemandcurves higher and flatterthan
that ofmember N (recall Figure 2).
‘° See Hart and Moore(1996, p. 64) for a detailed derivation ofa similar expression.
14Co-operative members whose willingness to pay for credit is higher than N’s (higher and
flatterdemand curves) areprecisely the “borrowers” to which we referred earlier. Theyprefer a
lower pricefor credit since a given decrease in theprice translates intoa relatively large increase
in theirconsumer surplus. Conversely, members with demand curves lower and steeperthan the
median member’s demandcurve prefer ahigher price; these are the “investors.” This groupputs
relatively more weighton producer surplus. A growingrepresentation in the membership ofthis
groupcan shift the pricingofco-operativestoward that ofprivate lenders, as we show below.
Figure 4 portrays a typical co-operative member from eachgroup. Member i, an investor,
has a demandcurve lower and steeper thanthe median member’s demandcurve (not shown),
while memberj, a borrower, has a demandcurve that is higher and flatter than the median. Each
member has invested the amount I~.All members face thesame opportunity cost of funds; the
source ofthe differing demands forcredit is insteadthe members’ attitudes and preferences (e.g.,
attitudes toward risk, willingness to workhard, etc.)
A decision to reduce the co-operative’s price ofcredit from Pm to P~will unambiguously
increase the amount ofconsumer surplus available and decrease the amount ofproducer surplus
available. At Pm, a borrower (memberj in Figure 4) enjoys consumer surplus ofA+F and
producer surplus ofC+D. At thelower priceofP~,the borrower’s consumer and producer
surpluses are A+B+F+G and D-E, respectively. Thus, the borrowerprefers the lower to the
higherprice if and only if B+G > C+E. An investor, on the otherhand (member i), enjoys
consumer surplus ofA and producer surplus ofC+D if the priceofcredit is set at Pm. At the
lower priceofP~,the investor’s consumer and producer surplusesare A+B and D-E,
15respectively. Thus, the investor prefers the lower to the higherprice if and only ifB > C+E. In
general, theinvestorprefers a higherprice forcredit, while the borrowerprefers a lower price.
For concreteness, consider a credit co-operativewith three members. Member 1 is an
investor, the demand curve ofwhich corresponds to member i in Figure 4. We assume that
B<C+E in Figure 4, and member 1 prefers the high price, Pm. Member 3 is a borrower, the
demandcurve ofwhich correspondsto memberj in Figure 4. We assume that B+G > C+E in
Figure 4, SOmember 3 prefers the low price, P~.We now consider threepossibilities for the
locationofthe median member’s demand curve (member 2).
First, we assume that themedian member’s demand curve is identical to that ofmember
3. This is the case ofaborrower-dominated credit co-operative. The co-operative’s policy will
be to set the lowest pricepossible forcredit. What is the lowest feasible price forthe co-
operative to charge? Figure 5 shows that this lowest feasible price is P~ , which occurs where the
co-operative’s average cost curve intersects its aggregate demandcurve. The amount ofcredit
extended is then Q~.Taken as a whole, the co-operative generates consumer surplus in amount
A+B+C+D+E+F+G and yields producer surplus of H-F-G-K, as shown in Figure 5. Thus, total
surplus is A-i-B+C+D+E+H-K.
The second case weconsider is an investor-dominated co-operative. To illustrate this
case,assume that member 2’s demandcurve is identical to that ofmember 1. The co-operative’s
policy in this case is to set the price ofcredit as high as possible. There are two factors that
constrain the co-operative’s ability to set a high price, however. First, price competition between
the credit co-operative and other lenderswould drive each toward the competitiveprice and
quantity, Pe and Qe in Figure 5. Ifcollusion were feasible atthe monopolyprice, consumer
16surplus would be only A, while producer surplus would total B+C+H. The second constraint on
the co-operative’s freedom to set its price at a high level is the threat ofmember withdrawal, to
which we turn in Section III. Clearly, member 3 would not be willing to remain a member if the
co-operative’s price for credit exceeded that available from other sources.11
Finally, consider thecase in which member 2’s demandcurve is intermediate to those of
members 1 and 3. Suppose further that member 2’s preferences are a perfectly weightedaverage
ofthose ofthe other two members. This situation-- perhaps unlikely but certainly possible--
would lead the co-operative to offer credit atthe level Qe and ata priceP~in Figure 5 (see Hart
and Moore, 1996, p. 66). When the median member has average preferences forthe co-
operative, borrowers’ and investors’ oppositely skewed preferences areperfectly offsetting; the
distortions introduced by eachtype ofmember are cancelled out.
To see this razor’ s-edge situation ofa balanced co-operativein the general case, assume
that the median co-operative member, N, has average preferences; that is, q, = [1/(2N-1)]Q~.
Replacing this expression in (2) yields the payofffacedby themedian member when he is also
the average member:
(3) UN(P) = [ ~ 1[~ - P)2 1+ I Q~ 1l[~ - ~ (P- cQ)l -
[(2N—1)j[2(V—v)j [(2N—1)fl[(V—v) j Q~
Differentiating (3) with respectto P gives us thebalanced credit co-operative’s first-order
condition:
(4) U (P) = [(2N_lXV_v)l~P) = 0.
“Recall, however, that it was precisely the sparsity of borrowing alternatives that drove the original co-operative
members to form the association. The threat of withdrawal may not be credible in some circumstances.
17Therefore, thebalanced co-operative would set its price, Pe, equal to marginal cost. In particular,
the price chosen by the balanced co-operative would be
(5) CQVV
cQ~+V-v
where Q~ is the quantity demanded when P=v (see the Appendix forthe derivation). Referring to
Figure 5, consumer surplus would be A+B+D and producer surplus would be C+E+H.
Therefore, theperfectly balanced co-operative,just like a perfectly competitive market, would be
moreefficientthan theborrower-dominated co-operative by the amount K and would be more
efficientthan a monopoly lenderby the amount D+E. These conclusions correspond to Hart and
Moore’sClaim 1, namely, that co-operatives become less efficientrelative to aperfectly
competitive market populated by profit-maximizing firms as their membership becomes skewed
in either direction (Hart and Moore, 1996, p. 56).
To complete the description ofpossibilities in the three-member case, note that any
deviation that exists in the median member’spreferences from the average in thedirection of
member 1 (an investor) tips the co-operative’s pricingpolicy toward that ofan investor-
dominated co-operative. Conversely, ifthe median member’spreferences are closerto those of
member 3 (a borrower) than to those ofmember 1, the co-operativebecomes effectively
borrower-dominated. Notice, however, that the investor-dominated co-operative bank faces
potential credit-marketcompetition while the borrower-dominatedco-operative does not.
18III. Theimpact ofchangingmember characteristics on German co-operative banks
Germanco-operative banks were founded in the mid-19th century by memberswhose
primary interest was in obtaining low-cost credit (Bonus and Schmidt, 1990, p. 190). Thatis, the
co-operatives were borrower-dominated. The typicalmember was a small farmeror a craftsman
without sufficient collateral to borrow from a bank. As shown above, this membership
orientation results in the credit co-operative setting the price ofcredit ata below-competitive
level, orP~ in Figure 5. As noted above, the not-for-profitorientation ofcredit co-operatives was
consideredso fundamental to theirnature that this business objective was incorporatedinto the
nineteenth-centurylaw that governed theirlegal status and operations.12
A volume-maximizing objective is not efficient from the standpoint ofresource allocation
because thereis deadweight loss (areaK in Figure 5). However, there exist no external(i.e.,
credit-market) forces to raise theprice ofcredit because the co-operative bank undercuts all other
actual orpotential lenders in the market. Nor were there strong internal pressures to change in
the earlydays, since the median member valued consumer surplus (access to credit) relatively
more highly than producer surplus (return on invested funds), and sincethe threat ofwithdrawal
by a disgruntled member with an investororientation wasnot very credible.
Changes in thestructure oftheindustrializing German economy ofthe nineteenth and
twentieth centuries foreshadowed dramatic changes in the population at large that would
eventually alter the strategic outlookofco-operative banks. Whereas only 4.8% of the German
12 “Thus, it became part of the co-operative movement’s self-esteem todissociate itself from the idea ofprofit-
seeking. It was even written into law that the purpose of a co-operative was topromote its members’ business
affairs, and that a co-operative that aimed for nothing more than improved dividendsshould be dissolved through the
courts” (Bonus and Schmidt, 1990, p. 190; italics in original). The promotion of members’ business affairs-- the so-
called Foerderauftrag, or “assistance obligation”-- remains theprofessed business objective ofall German co-
operative banks to this day.
19population lived in urban areas in 1871, this proportion had risen to 21.3% by 1910, to 77%by
1960, 85%by 1980, and 86% in 1994 (Born, 1976, p. 197; World Bank, 1980, p. 149; World
Bank, 1996, p. 205). This trend wasmirrored by an increase in the proportion ofemployed
persons, those whose livelihood consisted ofwages and salaries as opposed to self-employment
income. This fundamental transformation ofGerman society had the effect ofincresing the
numberofpotential “investors” in the population while decreasing the numberofpotential
“borrowers.”
Figure 6 shows that the characteristics ofthe membership ofco-operativebanks in
Germany has changed dramatically in thelast half-century, in large part because the population
as a whole has changed so dramatically over this period. Self-employed people in the
agricultural sector constituted about 35%of the membership ofco-operative banks in 1950,
whiletheir share had fallen to only 4% by 1990; during thesame period, the proportion ofthe
membership made up ofemployed persons-- who presumably have much less demandfor
business credit-- rose from 45% to 86%. Reflectingthe lower demand forcredit on the part of
employed persons, the share ofco-operative banks’ lending to this group is only about 50% of
the total, far less thantheir share in the membership (Aschoffand Henningsen, 1995, p. 61).
The model developed in theprevious section can provide insights into the effect ofthis
dramatic shift in the membership characteristics ofco-operativebanks. Recallingthe example
presented above ofa credit co-operative with three members, we canthink ofthe transformation
ofGerman society over the last century in terms ofa shift in member 2’s preferences from those
of a borrower to those ofan investor. As noted above, the effect ofthis change in the preferences
ofthe pivotal member ofthe co-operative is to pushfor an increase in the price ofcredit above
20P~, the low pricethat favors borrowers. As noted above, the situation in Germany today is
indeed that the terms and offerings ofcredit co-operatives are virtually indistinguishable from
those ofthe other bankinggroups (Ringle, 1989, p. 134).
Whathappens to the members ofco-operative banks who retain a traditional orientation;
that is, what becomes ofmember 3, theborrower? Clearly, the members with a high demand for
business credit might leave the co-operative if the priceis raised too high and viable alternatives
exist. Could exit by memberswho feel unrepresented affect thebank’s policy?
An important aspect ofthe dual roles ofcredit co-operativemembers as both lenders and
(sometimes) borrowers is the direct effect that withdrawal plays on the association. Considering
the three-personco-operative bank, a decision by member 3 to withdraw from the co-operative is
similar in effect to a bank run. In other words, exit by a minority member (orgroup ofmembers)
servesas a very powerful disciplining mechanism on theco-operative bank. To see this, assume
that thenow investor-dominated co-operativebank seeks to charge an above-marketprice for
credit. Further, assume that the bank’s assetsconsist ofa loan to member 3-- the member with a
high demand forcredit-- funded by ownership shares providedby members 1, 2, and 3, where
each member is assumed to own a one-thirdshare ofthe co-operative’s assets. Withdrawalby
member 3 in effect forces the liquidation ofthebank unless theother members agree to take on a
credit commitmentwith the funds obtained from member 3 when he paysoffhis loan. Other
options would be to attract new borrowing members orto offer credit to non-members. At the
above-market priceassumed in this scenario, however, therewould not be any other source of
loan demand available to the co-operative bank.
21Therefore, the co-operative’s pricing is constrained by the threat ofwithdrawal by
memberswhose preferences are not represented by the median member. To avoid member
withdrawals, the co-operative must price its services no higher than the alternatives available to
members. In fact,market-oriented pricingappears to be the norm forco-operative banks today.
This allows theco-operatives to retain borrowing members and also attract non-members as
customers. Non-member business is, in fact, a fast-growing part oftotal co-operative-bank
business in Germany, with non-members outnumbering membersin theclientlist by a ratioof
perhaps 4:1 (Klein-Hessling, 1992, p. 33). Co-operative bank shares (deposits) provide
competitive returns, which canbe paid out ofthe earnings generated from loans to members and
non-members alike (recall Figure 1). Thus, it is evident that German co-operative banks have
adapted to the changingcharacteristics oftheirmembership, an outcome that is not foreseen by
most analyses ofcredit co-operatives.
22IV. The Role ofthe Verbund (sectoral co-operationagreement)
The basic units ofthe multi-tiered co-operative banking system in Germany are the
primary co-operative banks, which are owned co-operatively by theirindividual members. The
primary banks, in turn,jointly own the central institutions, including both regional banks and a
central bank forthe entire co-operative bankingsector-- the DG Bank (Deutsche
Genossenschaftsbank), which is itselfthe fourth largestbank in Germany (Bonus, 1992, p. 455).
In some parts ofthe country, thereis a three-tiered structure in which the primary banks
collectively owna regional bank, which owns a share oftheDG Bank. In other parts ofthe
country, thereis a two-tiered structure,where the primarybanks own shares in DG Bank directly.
In addition to theprimary and central bankinginstitutions, theco-operative banking
sectortoday consists ofassociated financialinstitutions including the country’s largest home-
loan bank (SchwaebischHall) and the fourth largestgroup ofinsurancecompanies (R+V
Versicherungen). Investment and leasing corporations, a capital-management firm and several
othercorporations also work together to providefinancial services to the ultimate owners ofthe
co-operative sector, theindividual members (Bonus, 1992, p. 455). The co-operative banking
sectoralso maintains its own auditing association and deposit-insurance fund.
Historically,German agricultural credit co-operatives were members ofregional and
national alliances beginning in 1872; the urban co-operatives followed in 1883 (Aschhoff and
Henningsen, 1995, p. 63). At theregional level, the co-operative banks founded central
institutions forclearing, refinancing, and otherpurposes. Auditing associationsensured that
adequatemanagement and risk-control procedures were being followed atmember institutions.
At the national level, a single sectoral “central bank”provided another level ofclearing and
23refinancing support to theindividual regional institutions, which retained control over the central
institution. The entire sector was built on a bottom-up, one-member, one-vote model.
Building on decades ofinformal co-operationand responding to competitivepressures
from otherbanking groups, the co-operativebanking sector formalizedthe sector’s structure in a
Verbund (sectoral co-operation agreement) in 1972. In principle, this agreement allows the
primary banks to resist any undue increase in their sizeand scope through growth or
consolidation. This is particularly important forthe co-operativebanks because, although
operating economies are important in order to provide competitively priced financial services, the
essence ofthe banks is theirlocal contact and member control.’3 The existence ofthe Verbund
justifies ourassumption throughout the foregoing analysis that co-operativebanks operate with
no cost disadvantage relative to private-sector competitors.
The Verbund is essentially an institutional framework within which all ofthe products
and services associated with full-fledged GermanAllfinanz (universal bankingplus insurance,
real-estate, travel, and other services) can be offered by the local primary banksoperating on a
relatively small scale. The functioning ofthe Verbund can be compared to outsourcing of non-
core financial services. Outsourcing has been increasingly adopted by small banks in the U.S. as
a viable competitive strategy, as well (Kapoor, 1997). The important difference in the contextof
the German co-operative bankingsector is that the primary banks-- and ultimately the members
ofthese banks-- themselves control the firms to which the non-core financialservices and
activities are outsourced.
‘~At the same time (1972), the previously separate urban and rural co-operativeorganizationsjoined to form a
nationally unifed co-operativebanking tradeassociation, or Verband(Bundesverband deutscher Volksbanken und
Raiffeisenbanken, or BVR). This body plays an importantrole in representing the interests ofthe co-operative
banking sectorin national and international forums.
24Another important componentofthe Verbundthat protects the primarybanks’ continued
viability is a “non-compete clause” that prevents primary co-operative banksfrom other localities
from entering any other co-operativebank’s areaofoperation. In addition, all Verbund
institutions are required to obtain permission from the relevantprimary bank before approaching
any ofthe latter’s clients (BVR, 1989).
Aninteresting application ofthe model ofco-operative decision-making presented above
is to the Verbund itself, since the “members,” the primarybanks,jointly own and controlthe
central institutions.14 Shifts in the characteristics ofthe members ofthe Verbund could also
affect the strategicdirection ofthis larger association. We now arguethat such a change has, in
fact,occurred.
Figure 7 shows that the average size ofprimaryco-operative banks hasincreased from
334 in 1960 to 5,154 in 1995, due both to an increasing numberofco-operative members overall
and consolidation of smaller bankswithin the sector. However, the increase in the average size
ofprimary co-operative banks disguises an increasing skewness in the size distribution among
thebanks (see Figures 8 and 9). In terms ofourmodel ofco-operativedecision-making, the
skewness ofthe membership in the co-operative Verbund implies that the median member is
much smaller than the average member. In other words, a bank with business volume in the
range 100-250 DM million would be the median, and hence pivotal, member ofthe association if
only the primarybanks had votes. However, the average bank is in the 500-1,000 DM million
range. Sincemany ofthe votes in the Board ofAdministration that governs DG Bank are in the
“ The primary banks are not fully enfranchised, however, as the DG Bank, most notably, is a public-law corporation.
The Federal Government and the Federal States retain some votes in the Board of Administration that governs DG
Bank. This situation dates back to 1895, when DGBank’s predecessor institution was founded (Bonus and Schmidt,
1990, pp. 184, 193-194).
25hands ofgovernment bodies, which may favor furtherconsolidation or other kinds of
restructuring ofthe sector, the median voter in the Verbund may be different from the median
voter among the banks themselves.
The large primary banks, like theborrowers in ourearlier discussion, might prefer to
receive financial services and products from the Verbund institutions at a low price, since they
are likely to be comparatively heavy users. These banks might value the consumer surplus they
receive from the Verbundrelatively more than the producer surplus (dividends) they get. The
smaller banks, on the other hand, like the investors in our earlier discussion, would probably
prefer a higher price ofservices in order to maximize the value oftheirownership stakes in the
associated enterprises.
According to some, conflicts such as these arising in the Verbund in recent years require
changes in the structure ofthe co-operativebanking sector (Bonus and Schmidt, 1990, p. 186).
In principle, thedemocratic nature ofthe Verbund should allow diverse interests to be
accommodated. The median member’s preferences arepivotal, so extreme views are ruled out.
Minority interests are protectedby thethreat ofwithdrawing from the organization. The cost of
exit maybe high for a small primary bank, however, so this channel ofinfluence maybe slight.
It remains to be seen if the Verbund oftheco-operative banking sector will prove to be as
flexible as theco-operative banks themselves have been.
26V. Conclusions
In the early period ofco-operative banking in Germany the orientationof most members
was overwhelminglythat ofa borrower. That is, these membersvalued the availability ofcredit
much more highly than the possibility ofearning a small dividend. Given the democratic voting
structure ofa co-operative, the factthat the median member ofmost co-operativeswasjust such
a person meant that these institutions lent at a break-even (below-marginal cost) level. The
banksearned no profit,but this in itself provided incentives forthe membersto remain in the co-
operative sothat they would have a chance to borrow at this below-market price. The
inefficiency engendered by this overproduction of credit services effectively served as a bonding
mechanismfor the members ofthe group.
As the characteristics ofthe membership ofcredit co-operatives changed, so did the
business policies ofthe co-operative banks. When the median member ofa given co-operative
turned out to be moreinterested in earning a good return on his orher investmentthan in the
possibility ofborrowing at a below-market rate ofinterest, the democratic voting structure
allowed the policy ofthe co-operative to shift. By raising the price ofcredit toward the efficient
level, the co-operativewas able to earn a profit and pay a competitivedividend. This allowed the
co-operativebank to retain its investment-orientedmembership although the previous core
membership-- the borrowers-- were less well-served thanbefore. The threat ofwithdrawal by
borrowing membersserved as a powerful disciplining device, however, so the priceofcredit
could rise no higher than thelevel available elsewhere in the market.
Thenationwide networks ofsmall urban and rural co-operative banks formed larger
groupings in order to exploit economies ofscale in payments,administration, and investment
27very early in theirdevelopment. This Verbund (sectoral association) ofbanking and other
financial organizations allowed theco-operative banking sector to attain efficiency levels
comparable to other moreconsolidatedbanking groups in Germany.
We have argued that conflicts ofinterest are importantelements in the structure and
functioning ofthe Germanco-operative banking sector. It may be surprising to some that this
sectorhas been able to survive and adapt to modern financial-services competition. We believe
ourpaper demonstrates that the co-operativeform ofcorporate governance can be, in fact, quite
flexible and successful even in thepresence of changingmembership characteristics.
28Appendix
Derivation ofa monopolist’s lendingprice. The one-period profit ofany lender is givenby
(1) H(P)=[~~~](P_cQ)_F for vPV.
Differentiating (1), we have
cQ+V which implies that ~ = 2 , as assertedin the text.
Derivation ofa balanced co-operative’s lendingprice. To find an expression for the priceset
by a balanced co-operative, Fe, we set aggregatequantity demanded equal to the supply curve
(which is Q=P/c) and solve forthe price:
Qv(VPe)Pe or p = cVQ~
(V—v) c e cQ~+V—v
as statedin the text.
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32FIGURE 7
Average Number of Members per PrimaryCo-operative
Sources: Ringle, 1993, p. 11; DG Bank, 1996.
FIGURE 8
Size Distribution of Primary Co-operative Banks in Germany
FIGURE 9
Business Volume of Banks by Size Category
Size category of bank (Business volume in DM millions)
Source: DG Bank, 1996.
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